The Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD (AT&L)) who, in an effort to reduce acquisition program costs, requested the Defense Business Board (DBB) form a Task Group to provide recommendations on how the Department of Defense (DoD) might better utilize fixed-price contracts. He asked the Board to consider the use of fixed-priced contracting across the full spectrum of the acquisition life cycle and provide recommendations, based on best business practices, on when and how fixed-price contracting might provide savings and reduce risk. He also requested the Task Group develop a rule set for using fixedprice contracts rather than other contract types, and particularly, consider the use of an appeals review and/or process within the rule set to help the DoD assure optimum contract type selections. A copy of the official Terms of Reference (TOR) may be found at Appendix A.
primary and secondary suppliers, defense industry trade associations, and the Australian Defense Material Organization.
The Task Group presented their findings and recommendations to the full Board during the January 21, 2010 quarterly meeting. A copy of the brief containing the final recommendations as approved by the Board may be found at Appendix B.
BACKGROUND
DoD's acquisition programs often experience large cost overruns. From 2000 to 2007, the total acquisition budget for all Major Defense Acquisition Programs more than doubled -from $783 billion to $1,702 billion (see DBB Report FY09-4, "Focusing a Transition"). This rate of cost growth is unsustainable and must be brought under control. Furthermore, these excessive costs consume money that otherwise might be used to sustain force structure. Starting in the 1950s, DoD had a long history of contract administration policies which vacillated between the use of costplus and fixed-price contracts as a means of controlling this growth. Unfortunately, history has shown that the extreme use of either contract type has proved incapable of controlling ballooning acquisition cost growth. (See Appendix B for an historical overview.)
The FAR represents over 40 years of historical wisdom and states a clear preference for the use of fixed-price contracts when program risks are low, and cost-type contracts when program risks are high. The Department clarifies the implementation of this regulation in the DFAR, which states that cost-reimbursement contracts are preferred for development efforts, particularly major weapons systems, because DoD assesses program risks as being too great.
The DFAR also guides program managers to use fixed-price contracts when program risks have been reduced to the extent that realistic pricing can occur (e.g., when a program has reached the final stages of development and technical risks are minimal). The DFAR also directs a firm fixed-price contract be considered when the requirement recurs or as quantity production begins. The DFAR strongly discourages Time and Material (T&M) contracts and only allows T&M contracts to be used when it is not possible at the time of placing the contract to estimate accurately the extent or duration of the work or to anticipate costs with any reasonable degree of confidence. The FAR allows the use of T&M contracts for commercial services but strongly encourages program managers to maximize the use of fixed-price contracts for future acquisitions of the same or similar requirements.
On March 4, 2009, President Barak Obama reiterated the FAR's preference for fixed-price contracts, and directed the OMB to issue government-wide guidance for using and overseeing all contract types.
1 In July 2009, OMB issued guidance focused on how agencies should obtain savings by improving their contract review process, analyzing risk, assessing performance, and strengthening the acquisition workforce and practices.
2 In October 2009, OMB again issued a non-regulatory report that provided further management guidance regarding contract type with a goal toward greater use of fixed-price contracts where practical.
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In reaction to the President's March 2009 direction, DoD's acquisition policy leaders, specifically, the office of Program Acquisition and Strategic Sourcing (PASS), located within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP), expressed a preference for cost-plus contracts to switch to fixed-price contracts when development of a major weapons program concludes Preliminary Design Review. At the time of this report, no formal guidance was issued either to incorporate this preference into policy, or to create awareness for contract officers to seek early opportunities to move from cost-plus contracts into fixed-priced contracts.
Industry had a more cautious reaction to the early use of fixed-price contracts. Industry leaders testified before Congress that fixed-price contracting was most suitable for weapon systems with a stable design and based upon verified specifications, (i.e., testing complete Technology Readiness Level 8 -Technology Readiness Level 9 (TRL 8 -TRL 9)). (See Appendix B, January 2010 Briefing, Charts 13-14) Industry also 1 Federal Register (vol. 74, no.43 cautioned against assuming that the sum of multiple new technologies, each at TRL 6, for example, equated to an integrated system at TRL 6. In essence, fixed-price contracts were not suitable for contracts with high cost risks such as development of major weapons systems.
OBSERVATIONS
The Board observed that the FAR, DFAR, and DoD Policies lack sufficient specificity with respect to the definition of risk, and therefore, further clarification was needed. Recent studies collectively showed that the biggest problems driving up the cost of weapons systems are: (1) inadequate planning of requirements, (2) poor assessment of risks, (3) cost realism, (4) stability of requirements, and (5) In regard to services contracts the Board observed that cost growth results from poor task definition and a tendency to defer to T&M type contracts. This practice is inconsistent with FAR 16.6 and DFAR 216.601 guidance.
Additionally, the Board noted that contracting officers frequently fall into the natural "creatures of habit" behavior, and use the contract type they are most familiar with, rather than conducting an objective review of the most appropriate contract for the requirement. Culturally, these behaviors need to be recognized and addressed through focused training on contract type selection.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the findings above, the Board approved three overarching recommendations to help DoD better utilize fixed-price contracting. The Board also recommended guidelines on the use of fixed-price contracting and an approach to clarify the definition of risk. A summary of these recommendations is below. A full listing of the final recommendations is at Appendix B.
Fixed-Price Contracting 4 REPORT FY10-03 Task Group 1. Add specific guidelines regarding contract selection to DoD Instruction 5000.02 and the Defense Acquisition Guidebook to:
a. Clarify the application of the term "risk" by adding TRL as a major determining factor, among others, to selecting contract type b. Delineate a clear hierarchy of contract preference where fixedprice is first, then cost-plus, and then T&M c. Divide service contracts over $1B into smaller increments with contract type determined on a task-by-task basis d. Integrate these guidelines into the acquisition life-cycle 2. Enforce adherence to rules through peer review, management oversight and new training -specifically:
a. Clarify and enforce the requirement for a Peer Review for supplies (i.e., weapons systems) contracts, not just services contracts b. Add a review of contract type to the list of Pre-Award Peer Review topics c. Develop a computer-based training module by the Defense Acquisition University to expand the education of contracting officers on the appropriate application of each contract type 3. Do not allow the selection of contract type to become prescriptivespecifically:
a. Require the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation to conduct an independent assessment of TRL, which should be used as a major determining factor in selecting contract type b. Modify DoD Instruction 5000.02 to reflect the FAR's guidance that: (1) cost-type contracts should strive to be incentive-based, (2) fixed-price contracts should also consider incentives to help manage government and contractor risk, and (3) award-fee contracts should be considered only when contractor performance cannot be measured objectively 
CONCLUSION
As the Department looks to better utilize fixed-price contracting, it is critical to look at history, lest they be destined to repeat the mistakes of the past. History clearly shows that extreme policy mandates for one type of contract versus another are not effective cost control management tools. The Board is hopeful that a clear hierarchical delineation of contract types and a clearer definition of "risk" as related to technology development (e.g., TRL) will bring clarity and consistency to contract type selection. However, implementation across the Department will require the Deputy Secretary to direct the Service Acquisition Executives to align their policies and programs with these recommendations, and to implement metrics to measure and track training for contracting officers. Institutionalizing these best practices will be critical to the Department's success in achieving real cost savings necessary for the recapitalization of our nation's forces. 
ASSUMPTIONS:
TASK: In an effort to reduce acquisition program costs, the Group will provide recommendations on how the Department might better utilize fixed-price contracts. The Group will consider the use of fixed-priced contracting across the spectrum of the acquisition life cycle and provide recommendations, based on best business practices, on when and how fixed-price contracting might provide savings and reduce risk. The Group also will provide a rule set for using fixedprice contracts over other contract types.
TASK GROUP:
Mark 
Government Assumptions
DoD relies on state-of-the-art technology as a strategic advantage on the battlefield, therefore, many programs have inherent risks
Fixed-price contracting is not used as frequently as it could/should be used
More frequent use of fixed-price contracting would help control acquisition cost growth -Fixed-price development contracts improve cost credibility with gov't.
Increasing contractor's share of risk in development contracting will sharpen competition and result in more economical and efficient methods of development and production, but the initial price will be higher Service contracts are poorly defined which results in cost growth mainly due to use of Time and Material (T&M) contract structure 
Current Policy and Regulation on Contract Type Selection

Recent Government Initiatives
Office of Management and Budget -March 4, 2009, President reiterated Federal Acquisition Regulations' preference for fixed-price contracts, and asked OMB to issue government-wide guidance for using and overseeing all contract types for the purpose of reducing program cost -Draft July guidance focused on how agencies should obtain savings by improving their contract review process, analyzing risk, assessing performance, and strengthening the acquisition workforce and practices -Final October memorandum re-enforced the July memo, and provided further guidance for better management and understanding of the appropriate contract type to be used -no requirements to use one type vs. another
To support this guidance, FAR changes are in process to better define the purpose and use of cost-reimbursable contracts Although more money is spent on services, more scrutiny/oversight and congressional attention is directed at major weapon systems.
Contracting officers frequently use the contract type they prefer or are most familiar with rather than the most appropriate for the contract purpose.
Fixed-price incentive-fee contracts for both weapon systems development and services contracts pose the challenge of identifying what to incentivize and how to measure success.
Government does not adequately plan for a transition of contract type across the acquisition life-cycle.
-Best run private companies adapt contract type as technology matures 1. Add specific guidelines regarding contract selection to DoD Instruction 5000.02 and the Defense Acquisition Guidebook:
A. Consistent with existing FAR and DFAR, delineate a clear hierarchy of contract preference in DoD Instruction 5000.02 and rigorously enforce compliance.
Hierarchy of use: preferred choice is fixed-price, then cost-plus, then T&M-contracts. As per FAR and DFAR:
-Fixed-price type contracts should be used when services provide for defined deliverables or requirements to meet specific milestones.
-Cost-type contracts should be used when the degree of uncertainty about cost, schedule and task precludes the use of fixed-price.
-T&M-contracts should be used only when it is not possible to accurately estimate the extent or duration of the work or to anticipate costs with any reasonable degree of confidence. Subcontractor labor should be included in the labor categories, not the subcontract .
B.
Clarify the application of the FAR and DFAR general term "risk" by adding a section to DoD Instruction 5000.02 on Selection of Contract Types to include use of Technology Readiness Levels.
Cost-type contracts should be used for complex systems, and particularly major weapon systems, if TRL has not achieved TRL 7 for the system & all its elements.
When the achieved TRL is between 7 and 8, a form of cost or cost incentive type contract should be considered.
Fixed-price type contracts can be considered for systems that have demonstrated TRL 8 and should be used when TRL 9 is achieved.
C. Modify DoD Instruction 5000.02 to require service contracts over $1B to be broken into tasks of smaller increments with the contract type determined on a task-by-task basis. 
